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Abstract 
 
We study the decision of when to invest in an indivisible project whose value is 
perfectly observable but driven by a parameter that is unknown to the decision 
maker ex ante. This problem is equivalent to an optimal stopping problem for a 
bivariate Markov process. Using filtering and martingale techniques, we show that 
the optimal investment region is characterised by a continuous and non-decreasing 
boundary in the value/belief state space. This generates path-dependency in the 
optimal investment strategy. We further show that the decision maker always 
benefits from an uncertain drift relative to an 'average' drift situation. However, a 
local study of the investment boundary reveals that the value of the option to invest 
is not globally increasing with respect to the volatility of the value process. 
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1. Introduction
Uncertainty and irreversibility have long been recognized as crucial factors of invest-
ment (Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974)). In contrast with the standard net
present value rule, which implicitly requires investment expenditures to be fully recov-
erable, or investment opportunities to be seized on a now-or-never basis, the real option
literature has emphasized the ﬁrms’ ability to delay irreversible investment decisions
(Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). In the presence of sunk costs, this ﬂexibility in the timing
of investments is valuable because it gives ﬁrms the option to wait for new informa-
tion. Conversely, the loss of this option value at the time the ﬁrm invests generates an
additional opportunity cost of investment. As a consequence, investment options are
exercised signiﬁcantly above the point at which expected discounted cash-ﬂows cover
the sunk investment expenditures.
In the benchmark case of a single indivisible project, the optimal investment policy
of the ﬁrm can be mathematically determined as the solution of an optimal stopping
problem. The prototype of this approach is the model of McDonald and Siegel (1986),
in which the underlying value of the investment evolves as a geometric Brownian mo-
tion. Under this assumption, the optimal investment time can be explicitly charac-
terized via Samuelson and McKean’s (1965) celebrated smooth-ﬁt principle. These re-
sults have been recently extended in various directions. For instance, Hu and Øksendal
(1998) study an environment in which the investment cost is driven by a sum of cor-
related geometric Brownian motions, while Mordecki (1999) considers the case of a
jump-diﬀusion value process. However, a common feature of these papers is their focus
on complete information settings, in which investors have no uncertainty about the
fundamental characteristics of investment projects.
In this paper, we analyze the problem of ﬁnding the optimal time to invest in an
indivisible project whose value, while still perfectly observable, is driven by a parameter
that is unknown to the decision maker ex ante. That is, there is a structural element
of uncertainty besides the standard diﬀusion component of the value process. This
captures in a simple way a variety of empirically relevant investment situations. For
instance, a ﬁrm might ignore the exact growth characteristics of a market on which it
contemplates investing. Alternatively, the owner of an asset who considers selling it
might ignore how the willingness to pay of potential buyers will evolve in the future. By
observing the evolution of the value, the decision maker can update his beliefs about
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the uncertain drift of the value process. This information is noisy, however, since it
does not allow to distinguish perfectly between the relative contributions of the drift
and diﬀusion components to the instantaneous variations of the project’s value.
The ﬁltering techniques of Liptser and Shiryaev (1977) allow us to re-state our prob-
lem recursively as an optimal stopping problem for a bivariate Markov process. The
relevant state variables are the current value of the project and the decision maker’s
posterior beliefs about the unknown drift of the value process. The existence of an
optimal investment strategy is then an immediate consequence of this ﬁltering formu-
lation. The multi-dimensionality of the state space is a key feature of our problem,
that distinguishes it from related investment or learning models. It reﬂects the fact
that the value process coincides with the observation process, so that its diﬀusion part
is both a genuine component of the investment’s payoﬀ, and a source of noise for the
identiﬁcation of the drift. Unfortunately, this also prevents us to use smooth-ﬁt tech-
niques to characterize the optimal investment strategy. Nonetheless, the martingale
approach developed by Lakner (1995) and Karatzas and Zhao (1998) in the context of
portfolio optimization problems with partial observation allows us to derive some basic,
yet useful analytical properties of the value of the investment option as a function of
the current state variables.
The main analytical result of the paper is that the optimal investment region is
characterized by a continuous and non-decreasing boundary in the value/belief state
space. Thus, in contrast with standard real options models, the optimal decision rule is
not described by a simple threshold for the current value of the investment, above which
it becomes optimal to invest no matter the past evolution of the value. The presence of
learning thus generates path-dependency, although suspension or abandonment of the
project are not feasible options in our model, in contrast with Dixit’s (1989). A striking
feature of the optimal investment strategy is that it may be rational to invest after a
drop in the investment’s value. This is because such a drop brings bad news about the
uncertain drift, and thus about the future evolution of the value, thereby reducing the
current opportunity cost of investment. If the current value of the investment is high
enough relative to his new estimate of the drift, the decision maker may give up on
learning, reﬂecting that “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush”.
An important question is whether uncertainty about the drift actually beneﬁts or
penalizes the investor. To answer this question, we compare the value of an investment
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opportunity with drift uncertainty and learning with that of an investment opportunity
in which the drift of the value process is known, and equal to the prior expectation of
the drift in the ﬁrst project. Using dynamic programming techniques, we show that
the decision maker always prefer the former investment option, despite the fact that
the value process only conveys a noisy signal of the drift. Hence, an investment op-
portunity with uncertain growth prospects always dominates one with average growth
prospects. The intuition of this result is particularly easy to grasp in the case where
the instantaneous variance of the observation/value process is small. Indeed, when
this variance decreases, the value becomes a more accurate signal of the drift, so that
learning occurs at a faster rate. The fact that the incomplete information problem is
preferred by the decision maker to the average drift problem then simply reﬂects the
fact that the value of the latter is convex with respect to the drift.
To get some intuition about the shape of the investment boundary, as well as about
the wedge between the incomplete information problem and the average drift problem,
we perform a local analysis for small values of the volatility of the observation/value
process. We show that, as this volatility converges to zero, the loss in value arising from
the need to learn about the drift vanishes, so that the value of the incomplete informa-
tion problem converges to that of the complete information problem. An interesting
by-product of this analysis is that, in contrast with standard models of investment
under uncertainty, the value of an investment opportunity with uncertain drift is not
everywhere increasing with respect to the variance of the value process. This illustrates
again the duality of the value process in our model. An increase of the variance makes
the decision maker’s payoﬀ upon investing more volatile, which per se has a positive
impact on the value of the option to invest by increasing the incentive to delay invest-
ment. However, since the value process is also the observation process, this also reduces
the speed at which the decision maker accumulates information about the uncertain
drift, which tends to lower the value of the investment option by reducing the incentive
to delay investment.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2. In Section 3,
we provide the recursive formulation of our problem, and derive some basic properties of
the value function. Section 4 derives the continuity of the investment region boundary.
In Section 5, we compare the incomplete information problem with the average drift
problem. Section 6 is devoted to a local study of the investment boundary as the
volatility of the value process vanishes. Section 7 concludes.
3
2. An Investment Problem
2.1. The Model
Time is continuous, and labeled by t ≥ 0. Uncertainty is modeled by a complete
probability space (Ω,F ,P). For any stochastic process X = {Xt; t ≥ 0} deﬁned
on (Ω,F ,P), we denote by FX = {FXt ; t ≥ 0} the P–augmentation of the ﬁltration
{σ(Xs; s ≤ t); t ≥ 0} generated by X, and by T X the set of FX–adapted stopping
times that are P–almost surely ﬁnite.
Payoﬀs. We consider an inﬁnitely lived decision maker, whose task is to choose when
to invest in a risky project. Investment is irreversible and entails a sunk cost I > 0.
The value of the project follows a Brownian motion with constant uncertain drift µ
and known variance σ,
dVt = µ dt + σ dWt; t ≥ 0, (1)
where (W,FW ) is a standard Wiener process independent of µ. While some of our
results can easily be generalized to any ﬁnite number of possible values for µ, we shall
hereafter assume for simplicity that µ can take only two values, 0 or 1. We denote by
v the initial value of the project. The decision maker is risk neutral, and discounts
future revenues and costs at a constant rate r > 0.
Information Structure. A key assumption of our model is that the decision maker does
not know ex ante the true value of µ. We denote by p ∈ [0, 1] his prior belief that µ = 1.
Ex post, the decision maker perfectly observes the value process V , but neither the
drift µ, nor the evolution of W ; i.e., his information at any time t is summarized by
FVt . It is clear from (1) that the value process conveys some information about µ.
However, because of the shocks σW to the value, this information is noisy.
Statement of the Problem. At any time t prior to investment, the decision maker
chooses whether to pay the sunk cost I to earn the gross proﬁt Vt, or to delay further
his investment. Since the only information available to him ex post is generated by the
value process, his decision problem is to ﬁnd a stopping time τ ∗ ∈ T V such that:
sup
τ∈T V
E
[
e−rτ (Vτ − I)
]
= E
[
e−rτ
∗
(Vτ∗ − I)
]
. (2)
We shall denote this problem by P. The objective of this paper is to characterize as
fully as we can the optimal investment strategy for P.
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Remark. Note that under the formulation (1), the value of the investment project can
become negative. Alternatively, one might set I = 0 and interpret V as the diﬀerence
between the value of the project and the investment cost.
2.2. Relation to the Literature
Before proceeding with the analysis, it might be helpful to brieﬂy contrast our model
with some closely related lines of research.
Investment under Uncertainty. As in the standard real option framework, we model
the investment decision as an optimal stopping problem (see, for instance, McDonald
and Siegel (1986), or Dixit and Pindyck (1994, §5.1)). The distinguishing feature of
our setting is that, since the decision maker can observe neither the drift µ nor the
evolution of W , he has incomplete information about the dynamics of the value process
V . Hence, his beliefs about µ become sensitive to information about the past evolution
of the value, which in turn aﬀects his anticipations about the future evolution of the
value. This implies that the current value of the investment is not a suﬃcient statistics
for the investment problem P.
Sequential Statistical Testing. The problem of sequential testing of the two alternative
hypotheses on the drift of the process (1) has been solved by Chernoﬀ (1972, §17.5),
assuming constant linear waiting costs. This is a pure optimal stopping problem,
whose solution consists to accumulate information until an upper or lower threshold is
reached by the belief process. A key feature of our model, however, is that the signal
received coincides with the gross value of the investment, so that the diﬀusion term
σW enters directly into the decision maker’s payoﬀ function. This implies that the
decision maker’s current beliefs about the drift of the observation process are not a
suﬃcient statistics for the investment problem P.
Optimal Experimentation. The optimal experimentation literature has recently inves-
tigated various sequential control problems under incomplete information and learning.
As most of these papers, we follow Chernoﬀ (1972) in parameterizing the unknown state
of nature by the drift µ of the observation process V . Again, a common feature of these
papers is that beliefs about µ are a suﬃcient statistics, either because the observation
process represents a cumulative payoﬀ (as in Jovanovic’s (1979) job matching model,
or in the strategic version of the multi-armed bandit problem studied by Bolton and
Harris (1999), and in the monopoly/duopoly pricing models considered by Felli and
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Harris (1996), Keller and Rady (1999), and Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1997, 2000)),
or because terminal payoﬀs depend only on beliefs (as in the optimal control/stopping
problem analyzed by Moscarini and Smith (2000)).
Learning in Financial Markets. The classical consumption/portfolio problem intro-
duced by Merton (1971) has been recently extended to the case where the investor is
uncertain about the drift parameter of the stock price process. While Lakner (1995)
tackles the problem via martingale methods, Karatzas and Zhao (1998) show that the
Bellman principle still applies and leads to explicit solutions for particular choices of
utility functions (see also Brennan (1998)). Last, Veronesi (1999, 2000) and Alexander
and Veronesi (2000) investigate standard ﬁnancial puzzles when the drift of the stock
dividend process is unknown and may change at random times. Equilibrium asset
prices are then derived from the dynamics of investors’ beliefs about the unobservable
drift. Here again standard dynamic programming techniques apply.
3. A Markov Formulation of the Problem
In this section, we ﬁrst derive a recursive formulation of problem P, for which a natural
Markov state variable is the pair (V, P ) formed by the current value of investing in the
project and the current beliefs about the drift of the value process. This allows us
to prove the existence of an optimal stopping time for P. We then use a change of
measure transformation to derive some basic properties of the value function.
3.1. An Existence Result
The Filtering Problem. The decision maker faces a standard signal extraction problem.
As µ is either 0 or 1, his beliefs about µ at any time t are summarized by the a posteriori
probability Pt = P [µ = 1 | FVt ] conditional on information available up to t. Naturally,
P0 = p, the a priori probability that µ = 1. From Theorem 9.1 in Liptser and Shiryaev
(1977), the belief process (P,FV ) satisﬁes the stochastic ﬁltering equation:
dPt =
Pt (1− Pt)
σ
dW t; t ≥ 0, (3)
where (W,FV ) is a standard Wiener process relative to the decision maker’s infor-
mation (the so-called innovation process of ﬁltering theory, see Liptser and Shiryaev
(1977, Theorem 7.12)), that veriﬁes:
dW t =
dVt − Pt dt
σ
; t ≥ 0. (4)
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In other words, the change in beliefs dPt is normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance P 2t (1− Pt)2/σ2 dt. In particular, beliefs follow a martingale.
It is worth noting that 0 and 1 are absorbing barriers for the belief process. That is,
if beliefs start at one of these values, they will stay constant almost surely. However, if
beliefs do not start at one of these values, then both cannot be attained in ﬁnite time.
These useful properties are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 For any p ∈ [0, 1], the unique solution (P p,FV ) of the stochastic diﬀeren-
tial equation (3) satisfying P p0 = p lies P–almost surely in [0, 1] and satisﬁes:
(i) P 0 ≡ 0 and P 1 ≡ 1, P–almost surely;
(ii) If p ∈ {0, 1}, then inf{t ≥ 0 | P pt ∈ (0, 1)} = ∞, P–almost surely.
The proof is standard, and relegated to the Appendix.
The Recursive Formulation. Note that, since W is not a Brownian motion under the
ﬁltration FV of the observation process, the formulation (2) of problem P is not re-
cursive. What the ﬁltering approach allows us to do is to transform P into a stopping
time problem for a bi-dimensional Markov process. Indeed, it is immediate from (3)-(4)
that the joint observation/belief process can be rewritten as:
d
(
V vt
P pt
)
=
(
P pt
0
)
dt +
(
σ
P pt (1− P pt ) /σ
)
dW t; t ≥ 0, (5)
where we have made explicit the dependence of V and P upon their respective initial
values v and p. Since the innovation process W , unlike W , is a Brownian motion under
FV , it is clear from (5) that the joint observation/belief process Xv,p = (V v, P p) is a
Markov process under FV . We can thus re-state P as the problem of ﬁnding a value
function G∗ : R× [0, 1] → R and a stopping time τ ∗ ∈ T V such that:
G∗(v, p) = sup
τ∈T V
E
[
e−rτ g(Xv,pτ )
]
= E
[
e−rτ
∗
g(Xv,pτ∗ )
]
, (6)
for any (v, p) ∈ R× [0, 1], where g(v, p) ≡ v − I.
Existence. Given the recursive representation (6), we are in position to apply standard
results in optimal stopping theory for Markov processes to prove the existence of a
solution to problem P. Assuming that the value function G∗ is well-deﬁned, which will
be proved shortly, let S∗ = {(v, p) ∈ R× [0, 1] | G∗(v, p) = g(v, p)} be the coincidence
set for our problem. Also, deﬁne b∗(p) = inf{v ∈ R | (v, p) ∈ S∗} for any given belief
p ∈ [0, 1]. The following result is proved in the Appendix.
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Proposition 3.1 The following holds
(i) There exist an optimal value function G∗ and an optimal stopping time τ ∗ ∈ T V
solution to (6);
(ii) The coincidence set S∗ is non-empty and satisﬁes S∗ = ⋃p∈[0,1][b∗(p),∞).
From Proposition 3.1, τ ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 | V vt ≥ b∗(P pt )}, i.e., the optimal investment
strategy consists to invest when the value crosses an upper boundary that depends on
the current beliefs about µ. In what follows, b∗ will be referred to as the investment
boundary function, and S∗ as the optimal investment region.
Remark. Note that the extreme points of the investment boundary corresponding
respectively to p = 0 and p = 1 can be explicitly characterized by exploiting the
fact that they are absorbing barriers for the belief process. Solving P for p ∈ {0, 1}
simply amounts to ﬁnd an optimal stopping time for a discounted Brownian motion
with constant and ex ante known drift, a problem for which a closed-form solution
is available. We shall come back in Section 5 to the comparison between P and this
standard problem. For the time being, let us just point out that b∗(0) = I +σ2/
√
2rσ2
and b∗(1) = I + σ2/(
√
1 + 2rσ2 − 1), so that in particular b∗(1) > b∗(0).
3.2. Properties of the Value Function
We now derive the properties of the value function G∗ of problem P using a Girsanov
transformation introduced by Lackner (1995) and Karatzas and Zhao (1998) to study
portfolio maximization problems under partial information. This transformation allows
us to construct a probability measure Q under which µ is independent of V , thereby
leading us to an alternative formulation of the value function.
A Girsanov Transformation. Since µ and W are independent by assumption, W is also
a Brownian motion with respect to the enlarged ﬁltration Fµ,W generated by both µ
and W . Let us deﬁne a probability measure Q by its Radon-Nikodym derivative with
respect to Fµ,W,
dQ
dP |Fµ,Wt
= Zt = exp
(
−
(µ
σ
)
Wt − 1
2
(µ
σ
)2
t
)
; t ≥ 0. (7)
Note that by construction, (Z,Fµ,W ) is a positive local martingale. Moreover, since
E [Zt | µ ] = 1 for any time t, it follows that E [Zt] = 1 and thus that (Z,Fµ,W ) is
8
a martingale (see Karatzas and Shreve (1991, §3.5.D)). Therefore, Girsanov theorem
implies that the process (B,Fµ,W ) deﬁned by:
Bt = Wt +
(µ
σ
)
t; t ≥ 0 (8)
is a Brownian motion under the probability Q. Since µ is Fµ,W0 –measurable and in-
dependent of W , and B has independent increments, it is clear that B and µ are
independent under the probability Q. It follows that B is also a standard Brownian
motion with respect to its own ﬁltration FB under the probability Q. Moreover, since
dVt = σ dBt, the ﬁltrations FB and FV generated by B and V are identical, as well as
the sets of stopping times T B and T V . Then, the following holds.
Proposition 3.2 For any (v, p) ∈ R× [0, 1],
G∗(v, p) = sup
τ∈T B
EQ
[
e−rτ
(
1 + p
(
exp
(
Bτ
σ
− τ
2σ2
)
− 1
))
(v + σBτ − I)
]
. (9)
Proof: Deﬁne, for i = 0, 1:
Ht(i, Bt) = exp
((
i
σ
)
Bt −
1
2
(
i
σ
)2
t
)
; t ≥ 0, (10)
where Bt is given by (8). Clearly, (H(i, B),FB) is a martingale. Therefore, using the
expression (7) for the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Q with respect to P, we can rewrite
the value function G∗ as:
G∗(v, p) = sup
τ∈T V
EQ
[
e−rτHτ (µ,Bτ ) (v + σBτ − I)
]
,
for any (v, p) ∈ R× [0, 1]. It follows that:
G∗(v, p) = sup
τ∈T V
EQ
[
EQ
[
e−rτHτ (µ,Bτ ) (v + σBτ − I) | FVτ
]]
= sup
τ∈T B
EQ
[
e−rτ EQ
[
Hτ (µ,Bτ ) | FBτ
]
(v + σBτ − I)
]
= sup
τ∈T B
EQ
[
e−rτ (pHτ (1, Bτ ) + (1− p)Hτ (0, Bτ )) (v + σBτ − I)
]
= sup
τ∈T B
EQ
[
e−rτ
(
1 + p
(
exp
(
Bτ
σ
− τ
2σ2
)
− 1
))
(v + σBτ − I)
]
,
9
where the second inequality follows immediately from FV = FB, and the third from
the fact that, for any τ ∈ T V , µ and Bτ are independent under the probability Q,
which implies in particular that Q [µ = 1 | FBτ ] = p. 
This result admits a natural interpretation. Under the probability Q, the value
process V = v + σB is independent of µ, so that no learning occurs: essentially,
we have transformed an incomplete information stopping problem into a complete
information one. Of course, this requires a corresponding modiﬁcation of the payoﬀs.
The decision maker now maximizes the expectation of a discounted weighted average
of H(i, B) (v + σB − I), i = 0, 1, where the weights 1− p and p reﬂect his prior beliefs
about the value of µ.
The above Girsanov transformation allows us to represent the belief process in
terms of the value process. A direct application of Bayes formula yields:
P pt =
pHt(1, Bt)
pHt(1, Bt) + 1− p =
p exp
(
V vt − v
σ2
− t
2σ2
)
p exp
(
V vt − v
σ2
− t
2σ2
)
+ 1− p
; t ≥ 0, (11)
for any (v, p) ∈ R × [0, 1], see Shiryayev (1978, §4.2.1). It is immediate to see from
(11) that beliefs satisfy a non-crossing property, in the sense that p > p′ implies that
P pt > P
p′
t at any time t, P–almost surely.
Properties of G∗. Using the characterizations provided in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, we
can now derive some basic properties of the value function. From (5) and (6), note
ﬁrst that, for any (v, p) ∈ R× [0, 1],
G∗(v, p) = sup
τ∈T V
E
[
e−rτ
(
v +
∫ τ
0
P pt dt + σW τ − I
)]
. (12)
Hence, using the non-crossing property of the belief process and the fact that the opti-
mal stopping time for P is P–almost surely ﬁnite, we immediately obtain the following
monotonicity result.
Corollary 3.1 The following holds:
(i) For any p ∈ [0, 1], the mapping v 
→ G∗(v, p) is increasing on R;
(ii) For any v ∈ R, the mapping p 
→ G∗(v, p) is non-decreasing on [0, 1].
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Our next result follows immediately from (9) and the fact that the supremum of a
family of linear functions is convex.
Corollary 3.2 The following holds:
(i) For any p ∈ [0, 1], the mapping v 
→ G∗(v, p) is convex on R;
(ii) For any v ∈ R, the mapping p 
→ G∗(v, p) is convex on [0, 1].
In other words, the decision maker is ready to accept risky bets on the initial value v
of the project, for a ﬁxed value of p, or on the probability p that the project has a high
drift, for a ﬁxed value of v; the latter implies that costless information about µ, in the
form of a mean-preserving spread over p, always has a positive value for the decision
maker. However, it does not follow from (9) that G∗ is convex with respect to the pair
(v, p), and thus that the decision maker would be ready to accept risky bets on both
v and p simultaneously. Indeed, we shall argue in Section 6 that G∗ cannot be convex
on its whole domain.
The last result of this section concerns the continuity of the value function with
respect to the initial conditions (v, p) and the variance σ of the observation/value
process. In the latter case, we denote the value function by G∗σ instead of G
∗.
Corollary 3.3 The following holds:
(i) The mapping (v, p) 
→ G∗(v, p) is continuous on R× [0, 1];
(ii) The mapping σ 
→ G∗σ(v, p) is continuous on R++.
The proof relies on the two formulations of the value function given in Propositions 3.1
and 3.2. Details are provided in the Appendix.
4. The Optimal Investment Region
Since P is intrinsically a bi-dimensional problem, the standard partial diﬀerential equa-
tion approach to optimal stopping is of little help, since no closed form solution for G∗
is available. In particular, it is not clear whether or not the usual smooth pasting condi-
tion holds along the investment boundary (see Shiryayev (1978, §3.8.1) for a discussion
of this point). Instead of focusing on the optimal value function, a task we shall return
to in Section 5, we ﬁrst determine some properties of the investment boundary function
b∗. We then discuss some qualitative features of the optimal investment strategy.
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4.1. Properties of the Investment Boundary Function
Our main ﬁndings about b∗ are summarized in the following result.
Theorem 4.1 The investment boundary function b∗ : [0, 1] → R++ is continuous and
non-decreasing on [0, 1].
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is divided into two steps. The monotonicity and left-
continuity of b∗ follow from standard arguments (see for instance Villeneuve (1999,
Proposition 3.2)).
Lemma 4.1 The investment boundary function b∗ is non-decreasing on [0, 1].
Proof: By Proposition 3.1, G∗(v, p) = v − I for any v ≥ b∗(p). Moreover, the
mapping p 
→ G∗(v, p) is non-decreasing according to Corollary 3.1. It follows that
G∗(v, p0) = v − I for any p0 ≤ p and v ≥ b∗(p), which implies that b∗(p0) ≤ b∗(p). 
The monotonicity of the investment boundary function with respect to beliefs cap-
tures the intuitive idea that, for any given current value of the project, the more
conﬁdent the decision maker is that the drift of the value process is high, the more he
is willing to ‘experiment’, i.e., to delay his investment. This generalizes to our incom-
plete information setting the standard result that the optimal investment trigger for
a project whose value follows a Brownian motion with a constant and known drift is
increasing in the value of this drift, see Section 5.1.
Lemma 4.2 The investment boundary function b∗ is left-continuous on (0, 1].
Proof: Let {pn} be a non-decreasing sequence in [0, 1] converging to p ∈ (0, 1]. From
Lemma 4.1, the sequence {b∗(pn)} is non-decreasing and upper bounded by b∗(p), and
therefore converges to a limit b∗(p−). By deﬁnition, G∗(b∗(pn), pn) = b∗(pn)− I for any
n ∈ N. By Corollary 3.2, G∗ is continuous, so that G∗(b∗(p−), p) = b∗(p−)− I. Hence
b∗(p) ≤ b∗(p−), and thus b∗(p) = limn→∞ b∗(pn), which implies the result. 
The proof that b∗ is right-continuous is a bit more involved. We ﬁrst need the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.3 For all (p0, x) ∈ [0, 1)× R++, and for each p ∈ [p0, 1],
sup
τ∈T V
E
[
e−rτ
(
x +
∫ τ
0
(P pt − P p0t ) dt
)]
≤ p− p0
r
+ sup
τ∈T V
E
[
e−rτ
(
x− P
p
τ − P p0τ
r
)]
.
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Proof: Fix p0 ∈ [0, 1). The result is obvious for p = p0. Consider some p ∈ (p0, 1).
The non-crossing property of the belief process P implies that the diﬀerence P p − P p0
remains positive P–almost surely. Hence, for any τ ∈ T V, we obtain that:
E
[
e−rτ
(
x +
∫ τ
0
(P pt − P p0t ) dt
)]
≤ E
[
e−rτx +
∫ τ
0
e−rt (P pt − P p0t ) dt
]
=
p− p0
r
+ E
[
e−rτx−
∫ ∞
τ
e−rt (P pt − P p0t ) dt
]
,
where the equality follows from the monotone convergence theorem. Next,
E
[∫ ∞
τ
e−rt (P pt − P p0t ) dt
]
= E
[
E
[∫ ∞
τ
e−rt (P pt − P p0t ) dt | FVτ
]]
= E
[
e−rτ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt (P pt+τ − P p0t+τ ) dt | FVτ
]]
= E
[
e−rτ
∫ ∞
0
e−rt E
[
(P pt+τ − P p0t+τ ) | FVτ
]
dt
]
= E
[
e−rτ
P pτ − P p0τ
r
]
,
where the third equality follows from the monotone convergence theorem and the fourth
from the strong Markov property together with the fact that P p−P p0 is a martingale.
The result then follows immediately from the previous inequality. 
Our next result is a simple consequence of the fact that the belief process P p0 is
locally Lipschitzian with respect to its initial condition p0 ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 4.4 For any (p0, x) ∈ [0, 1)× R++, there exists η ∈ (0, 1− p0) such that:
sup
τ∈T V
E
[
e−rτ
(
x +
∫ τ
0
(P pt − P p0t ) dt
)]
= x (13)
for all p ∈ [p0, p0 + η).
Proof: Fix p0 ∈ [0, 1). The result is obvious for p = p0. Consider some p ∈ (p0, 1).
Since the supremum in (13) is greater or equal than x, it follows from Lemma 4.3 that
we need only to prove that there exists η ∈ (0, 1− p0) such that:
sup
τ∈T V
E
[
e−rτ
(
x− P
p
τ − P p0τ
r
)]
= x− p− p0
r
(14)
13
for any p ∈ (p0, p0 + η). Suppose ﬁrst that p0 ∈ (0, 1), and let p ∈ (0, 1). Then, from
(11), the process P p−P p0 can be written as (p−p0) f(H(1, B), p, p0), where B is given
by (8), H(1, B) is deﬁned as in (10), and for any h ∈ R+,
f(h, p, p0) =
h
pp0 (h− 1)2 + (p + p0) (h− 1) + 1 . (15)
It is easy to check from (15) that the mapping h 
→ f(h, p, p0) reaches a maximum on
R+ at h(p, p0) =
√
(1− p)(1− p0)/pp0, and that the function p 
→ f(h(p, p0), p, p0) is
bounded above by some positive constant C(p0) in a neighborhood of p0. Thus,
sup
t≥0
|P pt − P p0t | ≤ C(p0) |p− p0|
for all p in a neighborhood of p0, P–almost surely. Since r, x > 0 and H(1, B) is non-
negative, there exists η ∈ (0, 1−p0) such that x− (P p−P p0)/r is a positive martingale
whenever p ∈ (p0, p0 + η). Hence, by the optional sampling theorem,
E
[
e−rτ
(
x− P
p
τ − P p0τ
r
)]
≤ E
[
x− P
p
τ − P p0τ
r
]
= x− p− p0
r
for all τ ∈ T V and all p ∈ (p0, p0 + η). Since the supremum in (14) is greater than
x− (p− p0)/r, the result follows. Suppose now that p0 = 0 and p ∈ (0, 1). Then, from
Lemma 2.1, we need only to consider the problem:
G†(p) = sup
τ∈T V
E
[
e−rτ
(
x− P
p
τ
r
)]
. (16)
If rx ≥ 1, G†(p) = x − p/r since x − P p/r is then a positive martingale. If rx < 1,
a standard computation (see, e.g., Bolton and Harris (1999)) yields that a solution to
(16) is given by τ † = inf{t ≥ 0 | P pt ≤ p†}, where p† = (γ − 1) rx/(γ − 2rx + 1) > 0
with γ =
√
1 + 8rσ2. Hence G†(p) = x− p/r if p ≤ p†, which implies the result. 
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 4.5 The investment boundary function b∗ is right-continuous on [0, 1).
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Proof: Fix p0 ∈ [0, 1), and suppose by way of contradiction that limp↓p0 b∗(p) =
b∗(p+0 ) > b
∗(p0). Fix some v ∈ (b∗(p0), b∗(p+0 )). For any p ∈ (p0, 1], let T ∗v,p be the
optimal stopping time for our problem starting at (v, p). Then, by (6) and (12),
G∗(v, p) = E
[
e−rT
∗
v,p
(
v +
∫ T ∗v,p
0
P pt dt + σW T ∗v,p − I
)]
(17)
≤ b∗(p0)− I + E
[
e−rT
∗
v,p
(
v − b∗(p0) +
∫ T ∗v,p
0
(P pt − P p0t ) dt
)]
.
where we have used the fact that G∗(b∗(p0), p0) = b∗(p0) − I. Since v − b∗(p0) > 0,
Lemma 4.4 implies that there exists η ∈ (0, 1− p0) such that, for each p ∈ (p0, p0 + η),
E
[
e−rT
∗
v,p
(
v − b∗(p0) +
∫ T ∗v,p
0
(P pt − P p0t ) dt
)]
≤ v − b∗(p0).
Hence, from (17), G∗(v, p) ≤ v − I for any p ∈ (p0, p0 + η) and, since the reverse
inequality always hold, G∗(v, p) = v − I, so b∗(p) ≤ v by deﬁnition of b∗. As b∗ is
non-decreasing by Lemma 4.1, it follows that v ≥ b∗(p+0 ) for any p ∈ (p0, p0 + η). This
contradicts the fact that, by assumption, v < b∗(p+0 ). Hence the result. 
4.2. Some Qualitative Features of the Investment Strategy
We begin with the following simple observation. Since b∗(1) > b∗(0) and b∗ is contin-
uous on [0, 1] by Theorem 4.1, the optimal strategy τ ∗ for P is not a trigger strategy
relative to the process V , i.e., a stopping time of the form Tb = inf
{
t ≥ 0 | Vt ≥ b
}
for
some threshold b. In contrast with the predictions of standard models of irreversible
investment under uncertainty (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), the value of the project
at the time of the investment does not therefore necessarily coincide with the maxi-
mum historic value. As pointed out in the Introduction, a rational investor may even
optimally decide to invest after a drop of the value. The model thus allows some form
of ex post regret. For instance, the owner of a house who sells it at a discount might re-
gret not having accepted an earlier high quote because he then anticipated a sustained
boom of the housing market.
This path-dependency reﬂects the fact that the innovations of the belief process
are positively correlated with the ﬂuctuations of the value, as is easily seen from (5).
Overall, the ﬂuctuations of the value have two opposite eﬀects on the investment deci-
sion. A positive (resp. negative) innovation in V has a direct positive (resp. negative)
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impact on the payoﬀ from investing immediately, and thus on the attractiveness of the
investment for the investor. On the other hand, a positive (resp. negative) innovation
in V indirectly increases (resp. decreases) the subjective probability that the unknown
drift µ has a high value, thus providing good (resp. bad) news about the likelihood of
further future increases of V . Ceteris paribus, this indirect eﬀect makes the investor
more (resp. less) willing to delay his investment.
5. Comparison with the Constant Drift Model
In this section, we provide a comparison between problem P and the standard problem
of ﬁnding an optimal investment time for a project whose value follows a Brownian
motion with constant and ex ante known drift. In particular, we want to determine
whether a rational investor would choose to exchange an investment project with un-
known drift µ equal to 1 with probability p and to 0 otherwise, with an ‘average drift’
project with a known drift equal to p.
5.1. The Average Drift Problem
Suppose that the decision maker has also the opportunity to invest, at the same cost
I, into an alternative project whose value is observable and follows a Brownian motion
with constant and known drift p ∈ [0, 1], and known variance σ,
dV̂t = p dt + σ dWt; t ≥ 0. (18)
We assume that the two investment projects with values V and V̂ are mutually exclusive
and that the decision maker must make up his mind at date zero about the project he
might later invest in. If he chooses the project with value V̂ , we can state his decision
problem as of ﬁnding a value function Ĝ(·, p) : R → R and a stopping time τ̂ ∈ T W
such that, for any v ∈ R,
Ĝ(v, p) = sup
τ∈T W
E [e−rτ (V̂ vt − I)], (19)
where v refers to the initial value of the project. We shall call this problem P̂, or the
average drift problem. Indeed, P̂ only diﬀers from P in that in the former problem,
the drift of the value is known and equal to p, whereas in the latter, it is unknown and
p is to be interpreted as the prior belief that µ = 1.
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It is well-known that the optimal investment strategy for P̂ is a trigger strategy,
i.e., a stopping time of the form T̂b = inf {t ≥ 0 | V̂ vt ≥ b}, for some b > I. Speciﬁcally,
let f(p) =
√
p2 + 2rσ2 − p and b̂(p) = I + σ2/f(p). We have the following result.
Lemma 5.1 T̂b̂(p) is an optimal stopping time for P̂.
This standardly results from the fact that the Laplace transform of T̂b is given by
E [e−rT̂b ] = exp
(
(v − b) f(p)/σ2), see Karatzas and Shreve (1991, §3.5.C). The value
function for P̂ can then be written as:
Ĝ(v, p) =

exp
(
−1 + f(p)
σ2
(v − I)
)
σ2
f(p)
if v < I +
σ2
f(p)
v − I if v ≥ I + σ
2
f(p)
. (20)
There is no a priori obvious relationship between G∗ and Ĝ, except of course when
p ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., the decision maker in P knows with certainty the true value of µ ex
ante, in which case they coincide. With a slight abuse of terminology, we will refer to
b̂ as the investment boundary function for the average drift problem.
5.2. The Comparison Result
Since the objective function in (19) is linear in the drift p of the value process, the
value function Ĝ for the average drift problem is convex in p. This implies that a risk
neutral investor is ready to exchange the option to invest in the average drift problem
for an option to invest in a project with value Vt = v + µ t + σ Wt and uncertain
drift µ ∈ {0, 1} drawn according to P [µ = 1] = p, provided he is informed of the
value of µ immediately after its realization, and can thus take his investment decision
under complete information about µ. In problem P, the decision maker’s information
structure is coarser, since he has only access to an imperfect learning technology—
namely, the observation of V . Nevertheless, we have the following result.
Theorem 5.1 For any (v, p) ∈ R× [0, 1], G∗(v, p) ≥ Ĝ(v, p).
That is, the value of the option to invest in the project with an uncertain drift is higher
than that of investing in the project with an average drift, despite the fact that, in
the former case, the decision maker has to learn about µ before taking his investment
decision. Geometrically, the investment boundary b∗ for the incomplete information
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problem P is to the right of the investment boundary b̂ for the average drift problem
P̂, as illustrated on Figure 1 below.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 relies on standard discrete time approximations of prob-
lems P and P̂. We shall need the following notation. Let Ψ be the space of continuous
functions ψ : R × [0, 1] → R such that the family {ψ(V vτ , P pτ ) | τ ∈ T V } is uniformly
integrable. Similarly, let Ψ̂ be the space of continuous functions ψ̂ : R → R such that
the family {ψ̂(V̂ vτ ) | τ ∈ T W} is uniformly integrable. For any ﬁxed δ > 0, inter-
preted as the duration of a discrete time period, deﬁne the following operators acting
respectively on Ψ and Ψ̂ by:
Qδ(ψ)(v, p) = max
{
ψ(v, p),E [e−rδ ψ(V vδ , P
p
δ )]
}
(21)
and:
Q̂δ(ψ̂)(v) = max
{
ψ̂(v),E [e−rδ ψ̂(V̂ vδ )]
}
. (22)
It is clear from these deﬁnitions that Qδ (resp. Q̂δ) maps Ψ (resp. Ψ̂) into itself.
Therefore, for any ψ ∈ Ψ, ψ̂ ∈ Ψ̂ and n ∈ N, we can deﬁne recursively the iterates
Qn+1δ (ψ) = Qδ(Q
n
δ (ψ)) and Q̂
n+1
δ (ψ̂) = Q̂δ(Q̂
n
δ (ψ̂)). Note also that Qδ is monotone, i.e.,
if ψ, ψ˜ ∈ Ψ and ψ ≤ ψ˜, then Qδ(ψ) ≤ Qδ(ψ˜), and that Q̂δ preserves convexity by the
convexity of the maximum operator.
For any v ∈ R, let ψ̂(v) = v − I, and let π : R × [0, 1] → R denote the projection
of elements of R× [0, 1] on their ﬁrst coordinate. It is immediate to check that ψ̂ ∈ Ψ̂
and ψ̂ ◦ π ∈ Ψ. Our next result follows immediately from the characterization of the
value function of an optimal stopping problem as the smallest excessive majorant of
the reward function (see Shiryayev, 1978, §3.2.2, Lemma 3, and §3.3.1, Theorem 1).
Lemma 5.2 For any (v, p) ∈ R× [0, 1],
(i) limδ→0 limn→∞ Qnδ (ψ̂ ◦ π)(v, p) = G∗(v, p);
(ii) limδ→0 limn→∞ Q̂nδ (ψ̂)(v) = Ĝ(v, p).
The interpretation of this approximation result is clear. For any ﬁxed δ > 0, the limit
with respect to n yields the value of the inﬁnite horizon, discrete time problem, where
the investor is constrained to stopping times with range in {nδ | n ∈ N}. Letting
then δ go to zero yields the value of the continuous time problem. Given Lemma 5.2,
Theorem 5.1 is a direct consequence of the following lemma.
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Lemma 5.3 For any (δ, n) ∈ R++ × N, Qnδ (ψ̂ ◦ π) ≥ Q̂nδ (ψ̂) ◦ π.
Proof: We proceed by induction. First, for any (v, p) ∈ R× [0, 1],
Qδ(ψ̂ ◦ π)(v, p) = max
{
ψ̂(v),E
[
e−rδ ψ̂(v + µδ + σWδ)
]}
≥ max
{
ψ̂(v),E
[
e−rδ ψ̂(v + pδ + σWδ)
]}
= (Q̂δ(ψ̂) ◦ π)(v, p),
where the inequality follows from the convexity of ψ̂ and the independence between µ
and W , together with Jensen inequality. Next, suppose that Qnδ (ψ̂ ◦ π) ≥ Q̂nδ (ψ̂) ◦ π
for some n ∈ N. Then, for any (v, p) ∈ R× [0, 1],
Qn+1δ (ψ̂ ◦ π)(v, p) = Qδ(Qnδ (ψ̂ ◦ π))(v, p)
≥ Qδ(Q̂nδ (ψ̂) ◦ π)(v, p)
≥ (Q̂δ(Q̂nδ (ψ̂)) ◦ π)(v, p)
= (Q̂n+1δ (ψ̂) ◦ π)(v, p),
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and the monotonicity
of Qδ, and the second inequality from the ﬁrst part of the proof together with the fact
that Q̂δ preserves convexity. Hence the result. 
5.3. A Remark on Trigger Strategies
In the previous subsection, we have used tools from dynamic programming theory to
compare the incomplete information problem P with the average drift problem P̂.
Since the optimal stopping time in P̂ is a trigger strategy, the reader might wonder
whether a more direct approach would not consist to restrict the strategy space in P to
trigger strategies conditional on the current value V of the project in order to compare
the value of this constrained problem to that of P̂. It turns out that this approach is
not conclusive; it is nevertheless instructive to understand why.
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To do so, let T V be the set of trigger stopping times for V , i.e., the subset of T V
composed of stopping times of the form Tb = inf{t ≥ 0 | Vt ≥ b} for b ∈ R, and consider
the following constrained problem:
G(v, p) = sup
τ∈T V
E
[
e−rτ (V vτ − I)
]
. (23)
Using (9), a standard computation based on Girsanov theorem and on the formula
for the Laplace transform of a trigger stopping time for a Brownian motion with drift
yields the following result.
Lemma 5.4 For any (v, p) ∈ R× [0, 1],
G(v, p) = max
b≥v
Γb(v, p), (24)
where, for any b ∈ R :
Γb(v, p) =
(
p exp
(
v − b
σ2
f(1)
)
+ (1− p) exp
(
v − b
σ2
f(0)
))
(b− I). (25)
The expression (25) for the maximand in (24) admits a natural interpretation. When
choosing an optimal trigger b in P, the decision maker maximizes a weighted average
of the payoﬀs he would get from playing b if he knew the true value of µ, where the
weights 1− p and p reﬂect his prior beliefs about µ.
It is clear from (25) that the choice of an optimal trigger in (24) depends on the
the initial value v of the project as well as on the prior belief p about the quality of
the project. Thus this choice is not time-consistent: a rational investor constrained to
trigger strategies would like to revise his optimal trigger strategy as the value changes
and new information about µ becomes available.
Formulas (24)-(25) does not allow to derive a closed-form solution for the optimal
trigger b(v, p) conditional on the initial state (v, p). However, one can unambiguously
compare b(v, p) with the optimal trigger b̂(p) for the average drift problem, at least
for some values of v and p. Speciﬁcally, let b˜(p) = I + σ2/(pf(1) + (1 − p)f(0)). The
following result is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 5.1 For any p ∈ (0, 1) and v ≥ b˜(p), b(v, p) = v.
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Since f is convex and positive, b˜(p) < b̂(p) whenever p ∈ (0, 1). Hence, for any such p
and v ∈ [˜b(p), b̂(p)), b(v, p) < b̂(p) and thus G(v, p) = v− I < Ĝ(v, p). For these values
of (v, p), the decision maker, when constrained to use trigger strategies, invests as if the
drift was constant and equal to f−1(σ2/(v − I)) < p, making him just ready to invest
immediately. This reﬂects an implicit risk-aversion due to the additional uncertainty
generated by the randomness of µ.
Clearly, Proposition 5.1 does not us allow to compare P and P̂. In a sense, this is
not surprising: the restriction to trigger strategies in P essentially amounts to deprive
the decision maker from the beneﬁts of learning about µ.
6. A Local Study of the Investment Boundary
While the comparison result of Section 5 provides us with a useful lower bound for the
value function G∗ of problem P, it does not yield any information about the shape of
the investment boundary b∗, nor about the wedge between the incomplete information
problem and the average drift problem. We now address these and related questions
in the case where the volatility σ of the observation/value process is small.
6.1. A Strict Comparison Result
In the remaining of the paper, we systematically index the value processes V and V̂ ,
the value functions G∗ and Ĝ, and the investment boundary functions b∗ and b̂ by the
volatility parameter σ. Our objective in this section is to compare G∗σ and Ĝσ, as well
as the investment boundaries b∗σ and b̂σ for small values of σ. Speciﬁcally, consider the
open domain D = (I, I + 1/r) × (0, 1). Our discussion will be based on the following
strict comparison result.
Theorem 6.1 For any compact subset K ⊂ D, there exists σK > 0 such that for any
σ ∈ (0, σK ], G∗σ(v, p) > Ĝσ(v, p) for any (v, p) ∈ K.
The proof of Theorem 6.1 is based on three uniform convergence lemmas. First, we
study the properties of the solution to the average drift problem P̂ in the neighborhood
of σ = 0. Next, we introduce an auxiliary problem P˜ which we show to be uniformly
equivalent to P in the neighborhood of σ = 0. We conclude by proving that P˜ yields
a strictly higher value than P̂ to the decision maker.
Local Study of P̂. First, we study the behavior of Ĝσ when the variance σ of V̂σ
becomes arbitrarily small. When σ = 0, solving P̂ simply amounts to ﬁnd a maximum
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of t 
→ e−rt (v + pt − I), yielding t̂0(v, p) = max{0, (I − v)/p + 1/r} whenever p > 0
and t̂0(v, 0) = 0 whenever v > I. It is then straightforward to check that:
Ĝ0(v, p) =

exp
(
−1 + r
p
(v − I)
)
p
r
if v < I +
p
r
v − I if v ≥ I + p
r
(26)
for any (v, p) ∈ D. We then have the following uniform convergence result.
Lemma 6.1 limσ→0 Ĝσ(v, p)− Ĝ0(v, p) = 0 uniformly on any compact subset of D.
Proof: Pointwise convergence follows immediately from (20) and (26) together with
the fact that limσ→0 σ2/fσ(p) = p/r by L’Hoˆpital rule. Next, for any p ∈ [0, 1], the
quantity σ2/fσ(p) is an increasing function of σ. Since Ĝ0 is continuous and the
mapping x 
→ exp (−1 + (v − I)/x) is increasing on [v − I,∞) for any v ∈ R, the
result follows immediately from Dini’s theorem. 
A key observation is that, for any initial value v, Ĝ0(v, p) is convex in p. In partic-
ular, p Ĝ0(v, 1) + (1− p) Ĝ0(v, 0) > Ĝ0(v, p) for any (v, p) ∈ D.
An Auxiliary Problem. To compare G∗σ and Ĝσ, it will be helpful to consider an
auxiliary optimal stopping problem that diﬀers from P˜ only in that the Gaussian
component of the value is omitted in the decision maker’s payoﬀ:
sup
τ∈T Vσ
E
[
e−rτ (v + µτ − I)] . (27)
We shall call this problem P˜. For any v, and for any prior belief p that µ = 1, we denote
by G˜σ(v, p) the value of the supremum in (27). Note that the information structure is
the same in P and P˜. This leads immediately to the following result.
Lemma 6.2 limσ→0 G∗σ(v, p)− G˜σ(v, p) = 0 uniformly on R× [0, 1].
Proof: From (6) and (27), we have, for each (v, p) ∈ R× [0, 1],∣∣∣G∗σ(v, p)− G˜σ(v, p)∣∣∣ ≤ σ sup
τ∈T Vσ
E
[
e−rτ |Wτ |
]
(28)
≤ σ sup
τ∈T W
E
[
e−rτ |Wτ |
]
,
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where the second inequality takes advantage from the inclusion FVσ ⊂ Fµ,W and the
independence of µ and W . For any a > 0, let T(−a,a) = inf{t ≥ 0 | |Wt| ≥ a}. From
standard optimal stopping theory,
sup
τ∈T W
E
[
e−rτ |Wτ |
]
= sup
a>0
aE
[
e−rT(−a,a)
]
=
a∗
cosh (
√
2r a∗)
,
where a∗ is the unique positive solution of
√
2r a tanh (
√
2r a) = 1 (see Karatzas and
Shreve (1991, §2.8.C)). The result follows then immediately from (28). 
It is worth noting that, given a prior belief p that µ = 1, it is possible to secure the
payoﬀ Ĝ0(v, p) in P or P˜ by mimicking the optimal strategy in P̂ when σ = 0, i.e., by
delaying investment by the deterministic time t̂0(v, p). This follows immediately from
the linearity of the payoﬀ functions in (6) and (27) with respect to µ.
Local Comparison Between P̂ and P˜ . We now prove that, as σ goes to zero, G˜σ
converges uniformly to a function that is a strict upper bound for Ĝ0 on D, which
implies Theorem 6.1 given the uniform convergence results of Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2.
Speciﬁcally, we have the following result.
Lemma 6.3 limσ→0 G˜σ(v, p) = p Ĝ0(v, 1) + (1− p) Ĝ0(v, 0) uniformly on any compact
subset of D.
Proof: Note ﬁrst that, for any σ > 0 and for any prior belief p ∈ [0, 1] that µ = 1,
we have, from (27) and the inclusion FVσ ⊂ Fµ,W ,
G˜σ(v, p) ≤ sup
τ∈T µ,W
E
[
e−rτ (v + µτ − I)]
= p Ĝ0(v, 1) + (1− p) Ĝ0(v, 0).
Thus, lim supσ→0 G˜σ(v, p) ≤ p Ĝ0(v, 1) + (1 − p) Ĝ0(v, 0) for any (v, p) ∈ R × [0, 1].
Conversely, consider the following strategy in P˜. First, wait for a deterministic time
ε ∈ (0, t̂0(v, p)). Next, delay further investment by t̂0 (v + εP pε , P pε ), i.e., the amount of
time that is optimal in P˜ in the state (v + εP pε , P pε ). We have:
G˜σ(v, p) ≥ E
[
e−r(ε+t̂0(v+εP
p
ε ,P
p
ε )) (v + µ (ε + t̂0 (v + εP pε , P pε ))− I)]
= E
[
e−rε E
[
e−rt̂0(v+εP
p
ε ,P
p
ε )
(
v + µ ε + µ t̂0 (v + εP
p
ε , P
p
ε )− I
) | FVσε ]] (29)
= E
[
e−rε Ĝ0 (v + εP pε , P
p
ε )
]
,
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where the last equality follows from the deﬁnition of Ĝ0. Rewriting (11) and making
the dependence of P p on σ explicit, we get:
P pε (σ) =
p exp
(
σWε + (µ− 12) ε
σ2
)
p exp
(
σWε + (µ− 12) ε
σ2
)
+ 1− p
,
from which we get that limσ→0 P pε (σ) = µ, P–almost surely. As Ĝ0 (v + εP
p
ε (σ), P
p
ε (σ))
is positive and upper bounded by Ĝ0 (v + ε, 1) for any σ > 0, it follows from (29) and
Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem that:
lim inf
σ→0
G˜(v, p) ≥ E
[
e−rε Ĝ0 (v + µ ε, µ)
]
= e−rε
(
p Ĝ0 (v + ε, 1) + (1− p) Ĝ0 (v, 0)
)
.
Since Ĝ0 is continuous, we get that lim infσ→0 G˜(v, p) ≥ p Ĝ0(v, 1) + (1 − p) Ĝ0(v, 0)
by letting ε go to 0. Since the reverse inequality holds for the lim sup, pointwise
convergence follows. To prove that this convergence is uniform, note ﬁrst from (3)
that, for any σ > 0, we can rewrite the dynamics of P p(σ) as:
dP pt (σ) =
P pt (σ) (1− P pt (σ)) (µ− P pt (σ))
σ2
dt +
P pt (σ) (1− P pt (σ))
σ
dWt; t ≥ 0.
Therefore, from the time-change theorem for diﬀusion processes (see Øksendal (1995,
Theorem 8.11)), P pt (σ) coincides in law with P
p
t/σ2(1) for any t ≥ 0 and σ > 0. It
follows that, for any ε ∈ (0, t̂0(v, p)) and σ > σ˜ > 0,
E
[
e−rε Ĝ0 (v + εP pε (σ˜), P
p
ε (σ˜))
]
= E
[
e−rε Ĝ0
(
v + εP pε/σ˜2(1), P
p
ε/σ˜2(1)
)]
= E
[
E
[
e−rε Ĝ0
(
v + εP pε/σ˜2(1), P
p
ε/σ˜2(1)
)
| FV1ε/σ2
]]
≥ E
[
e−rε Ĝ0
(
v + εP pε/σ2(1), P
p
ε/σ2(1)
)]
= E
[
e−rε Ĝ0 (v + εP pε (σ), P
p
ε (σ))
]
,
where the ﬁrst and last equalities follow from the above time-change argument, and the
inequality from the fact that P p(1) is a martingale and Ĝ0 is convex as the supremum
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of linear functions of (v, p), together with Jensen inequality. Hence, the mapping
σ 
→ E
[
e−rε Ĝ0 (v + εP pε (σ), P
p
ε (σ))
]
is decreasing. Thus, by Dini’s theorem,
lim
σ→0
E
[
e−rε Ĝ0 (v + εP pε (σ), P
p
ε (σ))
]
= E
[
e−rε Ĝ0 (v + µ ε, µ)
]
(30)
uniformly on every compact of D. Note that this holds for every ε ∈ (0, t̂0(v, p)). From
(26), the right-hand side of (30) is equal to p Ĝ0(v, 1) + (1− p) e−rε Ĝ0(v, 0) whenever
ε ∈ (0, t̂0(v, p)). As ε goes to 0, this converges uniformly to p Ĝ0(v, 1)+ (1− p) Ĝ0(v, 0)
on every compact of D. The result follows. 
This result relies on the following intuition. As already mentioned, the decision
maker can always secure the payoﬀ Ĝ0(v, p) in P˜. In fact, he can do strictly better by
ﬁrst waiting for a deterministic time interval ε > 0 and only then playing the optimal
strategy in P̂ for σ = 0, conditional on the expected value of (v+µ ε, µ) at time ε. The
delay ε corresponds to a learning phase, during which the decision maker accumulates
information about µ before taking his decision. As σ goes to zero, the accuracy of
the value process as a signal of µ becomes inﬁnite, so this learning phase can be made
arbitrarily short. In the limit, everything happens as if the decision maker knew exactly
the value of µ at date zero, which implies pointwise convergence.
The fact that convergence is uniform in (v, p) on compact subsets of D follows from
a time-change argument. For a ﬁxed duration ε of the learning phase, reducing the
variance of the observation process eﬀectively amounts to increasing the duration of the
learning phase while keeping the variance constant. Since beliefs follow a martingale,
this generates a mean-preserving spread in the decision maker’s beliefs. As his expected
gain at the end of the learning phase is convex in (v + ε Pε, Pε), the payoﬀ from this
investment strategy increases as σ decreases to zero, which implies the result. Theorem
6.1 is then an immediate consequence of Lemmas 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, together with the
fact that p Ĝ0(v, 1) + (1− p) Ĝ0(v, 0) > Ĝ0(v, p) for any (v, p) ∈ D.
6.2. Comments and Interpretation
The previous results allow us to study the qualitative properties of the solution to P
for small values of the variance σ of the observation/value process.
Three Investment Problems. An immediate consequence of Lemmas 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3
is that limσ→0 G∗σ(v, p)− (p Ĝσ(v, 1) + (1− p) Ĝσ(v, 0)) = 0 uniformly on any compact
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subset of D. This means that, as σ goes to zero, the value of the incomplete information
problem P converges uniformly to the value of an investment problem where the drift
µ of the value process is ﬁrst selected according to a lottery on 0 and 1 with respective
probabilities 1 − p and p, and immediately revealed to the decision maker, who then
takes his investment decision under complete information about µ. In other terms, the
loss in value arising from the need to learn about µ in P vanishes as the variance of the
observation process converges to 0. The fact that the incomplete information problem
P is strictly preferred by the decision maker to the average drift problem P̂ for small
values of σ simply reﬂects the fact that the value function Ĝσ of P̂ is strictly convex
on D with respect to p and that learning about µ in P is fast when σ is small.
Local Comparison of b̂σ and b
∗
σ. From Lemma 5.1, the optimal investment strategy in
the average drift problem P̂ with drift p consists to delay investment until the value
V̂ hits the threshold b̂σ(p). It is easy to check that, as σ goes to zero, b̂σ converges
monotonically from above to the mapping p 
→ I + p/r. This implies that any pair
(v, p) in the triangle D′ = {(v, p) ∈ D | v > I + p/r} satisﬁes Ĝσ(v, p) = v − I for σ
close enough to 0. It follows then from Theorem 6.1 that G∗σ(v, p) > v − I, i.e., that
(v, p) belongs to the continuation region of P for σ close enough to 0. Moreover, this
reasoning can be made uniform on compact subsets of D.
Corollary 6.1 For any compact subset K ⊂ D′, there exists σK > 0 such that for
any σ ∈ (0, σK ], G∗σ(v, p) > v − I = Ĝσ(v, p) for any (v, p) ∈ K.
We can actually characterize exactly the asymptotic behavior of the investment bound-
ary function b∗σ as σ converges to 0.
Corollary 6.2 The following holds:
(i) limσ→0 b∗σ(0) = I;
(ii) For any p ∈ (0, 1], limσ→0 b∗σ(p) = I + 1/r.
That is, the optimal investment boundary function b∗σ converges pointwise to the dis-
continuous function b∗0(p) = I + χ(0,1](p)/r as σ goes to 0. The proof simply consists
to apply Corollary 6.1 to an increasing sequence {Kn} of compact subsets of D′ such
that
⋃∞
n=0 Kn = D′. To interpret this result, consider the limit problem arising from
P when the Gaussian component is omitted both in the decision maker’s information
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and in his payoﬀ:
G∗0(v, p) = sup
τ∈T V0
E
[
e−rτ (v + µτ − I)] . (31)
Since there is no noise in the signal V0, all learning about µ takes place at date zero,
as the belief process jumps instantaneously to one of its absorbing barriers, 0 (with
probability 1 − p), or 1 (with probability p). If v ≥ I then, in the ﬁrst case, it is
optimal to invest immediately, while in the second, it is optimal to wait until the value
reaches the threshold I + 1/r. Thus b∗0 can be roughly interpreted as the investment
boundary for the limit problem (31). Note that G∗0(v, p) = p Ĝσ(v, 1)+(1−p) Ĝσ(v, 0),
in accordance with Lemma 6.3. The area D′ represents the discrepancy between the
incomplete information problem and the average drift problem as σ converges to 0.
D′


p
v
1
I I + 1/rb∗σ(0)
b∗σ(1)
b̂σ
ﬀ b∗σ

Figure 1: Local Comparison Between P and P̂
Our results are illustrated on Figure 1. While b̂σ is unambiguously convex, the concave
shape of b∗σ is only meant to be suggestive. Note, however, that in virtue of Corollary
6.2, b∗σ cannot be globally convex on [0, 1] when σ is small. This implies in particular
that the value function G∗σ is not globally convex with respect to the value/belief
pair. Indeed, if it were, then, for any two points (v, p) and (v˜, p˜) on the investment
boundary b∗σ, and for any convex combination (vλ, pλ) of these points, we would have
G∗σ(vλ, pλ) ≤ λG∗σ(v, p) + (1 − λ)G∗σ(v˜, p˜) = vλ − I, so that G∗σ(vλ, pλ) = vλ − I and
(vλ, pλ) would belong to the investment region as well. But this can only hold if b
∗
σ is
globally convex on [0, 1], a contradiction.
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A Non-Monotonocity Result. The convergence of the investment boundary b∗σ to the
discontinuous function b∗0 as σ goes to zero has a striking consequence. Indeed, consider
some (v, p) ∈ D′ such that, for some σ > 0, G∗σ(v, p) = v− I, i.e., it is optimal to invest
in the state (v, p) when the observation/value process has variance σ. It is clearly
possible to ﬁnd a triple (v, p, σ) satisfying this condition, since b∗σ is continuous with
respect to p and b∗σ(0) is close to I for small enough σ. But since v < I + 1/r and
p > 0, Corollary 6.2 implies that, for all σ˜ < σ that are close enough to 0, b∗σ˜(p) > v
and thus G∗σ˜(v, p) > v− I. In other terms, the value of problem P can be a decreasing
function of the volatility σ of the value process, at least locally.


p
v
1
I I + 1/rb∗σ˜(0)
b∗σ˜(1)
D′
b∗σ˜
b∗σ(0)
b∗σ(1)


b∗σ
Figure 2: Non-Monotonocity with Respect to σ
Our ﬁndings are illustrated on Figure 2. Here, σ˜ < σ, and, on the hatched zone,
G∗σ˜(v, p) > G
∗
σ(v, p) = v − I. Again, the exact shapes of b∗σ and b∗σ˜, as well as the fact
that they cross only twice, are only meant to be suggestive.
This non-monotonicity result contrasts sharply with the predictions of standard real
option models (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, §5.4)). There, a greater uncertainty (in the
sense of a higher σ) typically increases the value of a ﬁrm’s investment opportunity, and
increases the critical value at which investment takes place by raising the opportunity
cost of exercising the option to invest. A similar result also holds for the average drift
problem, as b̂σ and therefore Ĝσ are clearly increasing in σ. The intuition is that when
the volatility increases, the decision maker can achieve a higher exposition to upside
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realizations of the value by increasing his investment trigger, while being protected
from downside risk.
In the incomplete information problem, by contrast, the decision maker is not pro-
tected from downside risk, since the investment boundary is not ﬂat in p. An increase
in σ has thus an ambiguous eﬀect on the value of the option to invest, because of the
interplay between two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, an increase in σ raises the
volatility of the decision maker’s payoﬀ at the time of the investment, which tends to
increase the value of the option to invest; one might call this standard eﬀect the real
option eﬀect by analogy with the complete information case. On the other hand, a
raise in σ decreases the volatility of the belief process, which tends to impede learning
about µ, and thus to reduce the opportunity cost to exert the option to invest. One
might call this countervailing eﬀect the ineﬃcient learning eﬀect. On the hatched zone
in Figure 2, the ineﬃcient learning eﬀect clearly dominates. In this zone, a reduction
in σ is likely to delay investment. This casts some doubt on the eﬀectiveness of policies
aiming at promoting investment by reducing the level of uncertainty, at least when
such a reduction in uncertainty facilitates learning.
Overall, the impact of an increase in σ on the value of the option to invest depends
on which of the real option and the ineﬃcient learning eﬀects dominates. It is diﬃcult
to map precisely the parameter space in terms of this distinction. Note however that,
since b∗σ(0) and b
∗
σ(1) are both increasing functions of σ and b
∗
σ(p) is a continuous non-
decreasing function of p, b∗σ(p) must at least be locally increasing in σ in neighborhoods
of 0 and 1, as well as G∗σ(v, p) for v close enough to b
∗
σ(p) (see Figure 2 for an illustration
of this eﬀect). Intuitively, if the decision maker is already fairly conﬁdent in his estimate
of µ, an increase in σ will only have a marginal impact on the eﬃciency of learning,
since his beliefs are unlikely to change very fast anyway. The increased volatility of his
payoﬀ make him however willing to delay his investment further, thereby increasing
the value of his option to invest. In that case, the real option eﬀect compensates for
the decreased eﬃciency of learning.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper has focused on the qualitative properties of the optimal decision to invest
in a project whose value is observable but driven by a parameter that is unknown to
the decision maker ex ante. We have shown that the optimal investment strategy is
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characterized by a continuous and non-decreasing boundary in the value/belief state
space. The presence of learning implies that the optimal investment strategy is path-
dependent. In particular, the value of the project at the time of the investment does
not necessarily coincide with its historic maximum.
We have shown that the decision maker always beneﬁt from being uncertain about
the drift of the value process. That is, he prefers the option to invest in a project with
unknown drift to that of investing in a project with a constant drift equal to the prior
expectation of the drift in the ﬁrst option. Thus one might expect the value of claims
on structurally uncertain assets—e.g., in an emerging sector in which future growth
prospects are uncertain—to be higher than that of claims on assets in more traditional
sectors with otherwise identical risk characteristics.
A signiﬁcant point of departure with the standard real option model is that the
value of the option to invest is not everywhere increasing with respect to the volatility
of the value process. Thus, while drift uncertainty always beneﬁt a risk neutral investor,
non-structural uncertainty might prove harmful. As we argued, this non-monotonicity
can be interpreted in terms of two countervailing eﬀects: the real option eﬀect and the
ineﬃcient learning eﬀect.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Note that for any t ≥ 0, P 0t =
∫ t
0
P 0s (1− P 0s ) dW s satisﬁes:
E
[
(P 0t )
2
]
=
∫ t
0
E
[
(P 0s )
2(1− P 0s )2
]
ds ≤
∫ t
0
E
[
(P 0s )
2
]
ds.
Thus, by Gronwall’s lemma, we obtain that E
[
(P 0t )
2
]
= 0, and therefore P 0t = 0, P–almost surely.
Since 1−P 1t =
∫ t
0
P 0s (1−P 0s ) dW s, this argument also implies that P 1t = 1, P–almost surely. Part (ii)
is a direct application of Feller’s test for explosions (Karatzas and Shreve (1991, Theorem 5.5.29). 
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Note ﬁrst that, since immediate stopping is always a feasible strategy,
the supremum in (6) must be non-negative. Next, from (5) and the deﬁnition of g, it follows that, for
all (v, p) ∈ R× [0, 1],
G∗(v, p) = sup
τ∈T V
E
[
e−rτ
(
v + σW τ +
∫ τ
0
P pt dt− I
)]
≤ sup
τ∈T V
E
[
e−rτ
(
v + τ + σW τ − I
)]
(32)
= E
[
e−rτ
max (
v + τmax + σW τmax − I
)]
,
where τmax = inf{t ≥ 0 | v + t + σW t ≥ bmax} for some bmax > 0 that can be explicitly computed
given that W is a Brownian motion under FV , see Lemma 5.1. It is easy to check that bmax = b∗(1)
and that the right-hand side of (32) coincides with G∗(v, 1). In particular, G∗ is well-deﬁned. Let
τ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 | Xv,pt ∈ C∗}, where C∗ = {(v, p) ∈ R × [0, 1] | G∗(v, p) > g(v, p)} is the continuation
region for our problem. Since the family of random variables {e−rτW−τ | τ ∈ T V } is uniformly
integrable, a suﬃcient condition for:
G∗(v, p) = E
[
e−rτ
∗
g(Xv,pτ∗ )
]
= E
[
e−rτ
∗
(
v + σW τ∗ +
∫ τ∗
0
P pt dt− I
)]
is that τ∗ be ﬁnite, P–almost surely (see Øksendall (1995, Theorem 10.9, and the remark p. 195)).
To prove this, note ﬁrst that τ∗ ≤ T vb∗(1) = inf{t ≥ 0 | v + σW t +
∫ t
0
P pu du ≥ b∗(1)}, P–almost
surely. Indeed, if not, then with positive P–probability, G∗
(
b∗(1), P pTv
b∗(1)
)
> b∗(1) − I = G∗(b∗(1), 1)
by deﬁnition of τ∗, which contradicts (32). Since T vb∗(1) ≤ inf{t ≥ 0 | v + σW t ≥ b∗(1)} which is
P–almost surely ﬁnite, part (i) follows and S∗ = R× [0, 1] \ C∗ = ∅. Last, suppose that (v, p) ∈ S∗, so
that G∗(v, p) = v− I. For any h > 0, discounting implies that G∗(v+h, p) ≤ G∗(v, p)+h = v+h− I.
Since the reverse inequality always hold as immediate stopping is always a feasible strategy, we obtain
G∗(v + h, p) = v + h− I, hence (v + h, p) ∈ S∗, which implies the second half of (ii). 
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Proof of Corollary 3.3: First, note from (6) that, for any (v, v0, p) ∈ R2 × [0, 1],
|G∗(v, p)−G∗(v0, p)| ≤ |v − v0|. (33)
Next, from (9), we have, for any (v, p, p0) ∈ R× [0, 1]2,
(p− p0) EQ
[
e−rT
∗
v,p0
(
v + σBT∗v,p0 − I
)(
exp
(
BT∗v,p0
σ
− T
∗
v,p0
2σ2
)
− 1
)]
≤ G∗(v, p)−G∗(v, p0)
≤ (p− p0) EQ
[
e−rT
∗
v,p
(
v + σBT∗v,p − I
)(
exp
(
BT∗v,p
σ
− T
∗
v,p
2σ2
)
− 1
)]
.
By Corollary 3.1, the mapping p 
→ G∗(v, p) is non-decreasing. Hence:∣∣∣∣G∗(v, p)−G∗(v, p0)p− p0
∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxp˜∈{p,p0}EQ
[
e−rT
∗
v,p˜
(
v + σBT∗
v,p˜
− I
)(
exp
(
BT∗
v,p˜
σ
− T
∗
v,p˜
2σ2
)
− 1
)]
≤ sup
τ∈T V
EQ
[
e−rτ (v + σBτ − I)
(
exp
(
Bτ
σ
− τ
2σ2
)
+ 1
)]
(34)
≤ G∗(v, 0) + G∗(v, 1),
where the second inequality follows from the fact that both v + σBT∗v,p − I and v + σBT∗v,p0 − I
must be non-negative, P–almost surely by (9), and the third from (9) again, applied respectively
to p = 1 and p = 0. Using the two uniform upper bounds (33) and (34), we obtain that for any
(v, v0, p, p0) ∈ R2 × [0, 1]2,
|G∗(v, p)−G∗(v0, p0)| ≤ |G∗(v, p)−G∗(v0, p)|+ |G∗(v0, p)−G∗(v0, p0)|
≤ |v − v0|+ (G∗(v0, 0) + G∗(v0, 1)) |p− p0| ,
which implies (i). To prove (ii), deﬁne, for any t ≥ 0, Nt = exp (Bt/σ− t/2σ2)− exp (Bt/σ0− t/2σ20),
and note from (9) that, for all (v, p, σ, σ0) ∈ R× [0, 1]× R2++,∣∣G∗σ(v, p)−G∗σ0(v, p)∣∣ ≤ sup
τ∈T B
∣∣∣∣(σ − σ0) EQ [e−rτ (p exp(Bτσ − τ2σ2
)
+ 1− p
)
Bτ
]∣∣∣∣
(35)
+ p sup
τ∈T B
∣∣EQ [e−rτNτ (v + σ0Bτ − I)]∣∣ .
Deﬁne a probability measure Qσ by its Radon-Nikodym derivative dQσ/dQ|FBt = exp (Bt/σ − t/2σ2)
with respect to FB . A direct application of Girsanov theorem shows that the ﬁrst term on the
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right-hand side of (35) is bounded above by |σ−σ0|
(
supτ∈T Bσ EQσ [e−rτ |Bστ |] + supt≥0 e−rtt
)
, where
Bσ is a standard Brownian motion under Qσ. This in turn clearly converges to 0 as σ converges
to σ0 since supτ∈T Bσ EQσ [e−rτ |Bστ |] is ﬁnite and independent of σ, see the proof of Lemma 5.4.
Using Jensen’s inequality and deﬁning a probability measure Qσ0 and a Brownian motion Bσ0 under
Qσ0 by analogy with Qσ and Bσ, a similar argument implies that, up to division by p, the second
term on the right-hand side of (35) is no greater than supτ∈T Bσ EQσ [e−rτ |v + σ0/σ τ + σ0Bτ − I|] +
supτ∈T Bσ0 EQσ0 [e
−rτ |v + τ + σ0Bτ − I|], which can be shown to be ﬁnite along the same lines as in
the proof of Lemma 5.4. The bounded convergence theorem implies that for any τ ∈ T B ,
lim
T→∞
sup
τ∈T B
∣∣EQ [e−rτNτ (v + σ0Bτ − I)χ{τ>T}]∣∣ = 0. (36)
Next, for any (τ, T ) ∈ T B × R, we obtain, from Jensen and Cauchy-Schwartz inequalities:∣∣E [e−rτNτ (v + σ0Bτ − I)χ{τ≤T}]∣∣ ≤ E [e−rτ ∣∣Nτ (v + σ0Bτ − I)χ{τ≤T}∣∣]
≤
√
E
[
N2τ χ{τ≤T}
]
E
[
(v + σ0Bτ − I)2 χ{τ≤T}
]
(37)
≤ 2
√
E [N2T ]
(
(v − I)2 + 4
√
T |v − I|σ0 + 4Tσ20
)
,
where the last step follows from E
[
supt≤T Bt
] ≤ √E [(supt≤T Bt)2] ≤ √E [supt≤T B2t ] together
with Doob inequality applied to the martingales B and N . It is easy to check from the deﬁnition of N
that NT =
∫ T
0
(
(1/σ − 1/σ0) exp
(
Bt/σ − t/2σ2
)
+ Nt/σ0
)
dBt. From the Itoˆ isometry and Gronwall
inequality, we get, after some straightforward computations:
E
[
N2T
] ≤ σ
σ0
σ
(
1
σ
− 1
σ0
)(
(σ + σ0)
(
eT/σ
2 − 1
)
− 2σ0
(
eT/σσ0 − 1
))
eT/σ
2
0 (38)
Let ε > 0. By (36), there exists T ∈ R such that supτ∈T B
∣∣EQ [e−rτNτ (v + σ0Bτ − I)χ{τ>T}]∣∣ < ε/2.
Similarly, from (37) and (38), supτ∈T B
∣∣E [e−rτNτ (v + σ0Bτ − I)χ{τ≤T}]∣∣ < ε/2 for σ close enough
to σ0. It follows that the second term on the right-hand side of (35) converges to 0 as σ converges to
σ0, which concludes the proof of (ii). 
Proof of Proposition 5.1: For any (v, p) ∈ R× [0, 1] and for any b ≥ v, one gets, using (25) and
the deﬁnitions of b̂ and f :
∂Γb(v, p)
∂b
=
pf(1)
σ2
exp
(
v − b
σ2
f(1)
)
(̂b(1)− b) + (1− p)f(0)
σ2
exp
(
v − b
σ2
f(0)
)
(̂b(0)− b). (39)
It follows that argmaxb≥v Γb(v, p) = {v} whenever v ≥ b̂(1), and that argmaxb≥v Γb(v, p) ⊂ [̂b(0), b̂(1))
otherwise. From now on, we focus on the latter case. Let us ﬁrst show that b 
→ Γb(v, p) is
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quasi-concave on [v, b̂(1)]. If ∂Γb(v, p)/∂b < 0 whenever b ∈ [v, b̂(1)], the result is immediate and
argmaxb≥v Γb(v, p) = {v}. Otherwise, let b ∈ [v, b̂(1)] such that ∂Γb(v, p)/∂b = 0. Then, from (39),
∂2Γb(v, p)
∂b
2 ∝ (̂b(1)− b) (b− b̂(0))
f(0)− f(1)
σ2
− (̂b(1)− b̂(0))
(40)
≤ (̂b(1)− b̂(0))
(
(̂b(1)− b̂(0)) (f(0)− f(1))
4σ2
− 1
)
.
A direct computation reveals that the right-hand side of (40) is negative for all (r, σ) ∈ R2++, which
implies the strict quasi-concavity of b 
→ Γb(v, p) on [v, b̂(1)]. By (39), for any v ∈ [˜b(p), b̂(1)),
∂Γb(v, p)
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=v
= 1 +
I − v
b˜(p)− I
< 0,
so that ∂Γb(v, p)/∂b < 0 for each b ∈ [v, b̂(1)) by strict quasi-concavity of b 
→ Γb(v, p) on [v, b̂(1)].
Therefore argmaxb≥v Γb(v, p) = {v} in that case as well. 
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